Art, Jewelry and Other Personal Property

Who ends up holding disputed property

Most interpleader cases involve a check that has not been written yet: life insurance, a bank balance, a retirement account. Tangible property raises the same problem in a physical form. The holder usually has no claim to the object. It simply has the object, and two or more people say it belongs to them.

Typical holders include:

• Auction houses and dealers. A consignor sends a work to auction. Someone sees the catalog and says the work was stolen, looted or sold without authority. The auction house withdraws the lot and is left holding it.
• Museums. A museum may receive a claim against a work in its collection, or may itself claim a work that surfaces somewhere else.
• Repair shops and service centers. A watch or a piece of jewelry is sent in for service and turns out to be reported stolen.
• Pawnshops, storage companies and warehouses. These businesses may hold goods that a borrower, a buyer, a lender and a theft victim all claim.
• Police and federal agencies. Law enforcement may recover an object and then face competing ownership claims once any criminal matter is finished.

If the holder gives the object to one claimant, the other may sue it for conversion or replevin. Interpleader lets the holder ask a court to decide the ownership question once, with everyone present.

Does interpleader reach property, not just money?

Yes. The federal interpleader statute applies to anyone with custody or possession of “money or property of the value of $500 or more” claimed by two or more adverse claimants of diverse citizenship.¹ Rule 22 is worded more generally. It lets a plaintiff join “[p]ersons with claims that may expose a plaintiff to double or multiple liability,” which includes competing ownership claims to an object.² Rule 22 does not have its own jurisdictional grant, so in a Rule 22 case the ordinary diversity or federal-question rules apply. See statutory versus Rule 22 interpleader.

Courts have used both routes for art. In the Baltimore Museum of Art case, the court described Rule 22 and the interpleader statute as “provid[ing] a vehicle for a stakeholder faced with conflicting claims to a res — such as the FBI here — to escape the responsibility of assessing which claim among many is best.”³

Depositing the object, its value or a bond

The statute requires the holder to have “deposited such money or property” in the court’s registry, or to have “given bond payable to the clerk of the court in such amount and with such surety as the court or judge may deem proper.”¹ Rule 67 separately lets a party deposit “the money or thing” with leave of court.⁴

A clerk’s office is not a gallery or a vault, so courts often leave valuable objects where they are, under the court’s control. In the cases below, the FBI kept custody of a Renoir and a Monet while the cases were decided, and Sotheby’s kept a disputed bronze vessel after the court discharged it as a stakeholder. Practical questions that often come up:

• Custody and insurance. Who will hold the object, under what security and climate conditions, and who pays to insure it?
• Movement. Whether the object may leave the building or the state. In the El Greco case below, the court’s first order temporarily barred the auction house from moving the painting from its New York facilities.⁵
• Value. A bond needs a number. An auction estimate or appraisal may become a point of dispute in itself.
• Sale. Claimants sometimes agree to sell the object and fight over the proceeds instead. That converts a property dispute into an ordinary fund, but it cannot be undone if a claimant wanted the object itself.

The disputed property need not be the object itself. In a complaint filed in October 2026 and still pending, Ferrari North America sought to interplead only a car’s title document, the manufacturer’s statement of origin, offering to deposit the original paper with the court. See the pending cases below.

Who owns stolen property?

Ownership of stolen goods is a question of state law (or foreign law, where it applies), and the rules differ. A few principles recur.

A thief cannot pass good title

In the United States, a buyer generally takes only the title the seller had. The Uniform Commercial Code puts it this way: “A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had power to transfer.”⁶ A thief has no title, so neither does anyone who buys from the thief, however innocent. In the Baltimore Museum of Art case, the court held that a buyer who said she had found the painting at a flea market “cannot have good title as the possessor of a stolen work of art,” and added that “a thief cannot pass good title in any relevant jurisdiction.”³

Voidable title and entrustment

Two UCC rules can favor a good-faith buyer:

• Voidable title. “A person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value.” Voidable title can arise, for example, when goods were delivered in exchange for a check that later bounced, or when the original seller was deceived about the buyer’s identity.⁶
• Entrustment to a merchant. “Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in ordinary course of business.”⁶ An owner who leaves jewelry with a jeweler that sells similar jewelry may lose it to a buyer from that jeweler.

Whether a case involves theft, fraud that creates voidable title, or entrustment often decides the outcome. Many civil-law countries give more protection to good-faith buyers, which is one reason choice of law matters in international art disputes.

When does the time to sue start?

Limitations rules for stolen property vary sharply:

• Demand and refusal (New York). New York’s highest court held that a claim against a good-faith purchaser of stolen art accrues only when the true owner demands the property’s return and the possessor refuses. The court declined to impose a general duty of reasonable diligence on the owner as a condition of suing, although delay can be relevant to laches.⁷
• Discovery rule (many other states). Other courts start the clock when the owner discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, who has the object. A frequently cited federal example involved Byzantine mosaics taken from a church in Cyprus and later sold in Indiana.⁸
• Laches. Even within a limitations period, an owner who waited unreasonably, to the possessor’s prejudice, may lose under the equitable doctrine of laches. The Second Circuit applied laches to bar a claim to a Picasso held by the Metropolitan Museum of Art.⁹ For Nazi-looted art, that approach has now been displaced by statute (below).

New York’s federal courts have also stressed the state’s interest in “prevent[ing] the state from becoming a marketplace for stolen goods,” a phrase the El Greco court quoted from the Second Circuit.¹⁰

Nazi-looted art and the HEAR Act

The Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016 (HEAR Act) created a federal limitations period for claims to recover artwork or other property lost between 1933 and 1945 because of Nazi persecution. Such a claim may be brought within six years after the claimant actually discovers both the identity and location of the property and the claimant’s possessory interest in it.¹¹

The original act was set to expire on January 1, 2027. The Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2025, enacted in 2026, struck that sunset. For a claim that is otherwise timely, it also bars defenses “based on the passage of time, including laches, adverse possession, acquisitive prescription, and usucapion,” and non-merits grounds for dismissal such as act of state, international comity and forum non conveniens. Its findings name Zuckerman as one of the decisions it was meant to address. The amendments apply to claims pending on the date of enactment as well as later ones.¹²

An interpleader involving looted art therefore has to account for two layers: the HEAR Act’s timing rules, and the underlying state or foreign law on who owns the object.

Federal cases

Renoir: United States v. Baltimore Museum of Art (E.D. Va. 2014)

A small Renoir landscape, Paysage Bords de Seine, had been on loan to the Baltimore Museum of Art and was stolen in 1951. Decades later, a buyer who said she found it at a flea market consigned it for auction. The FBI took possession, and the United States filed an interpleader under Rule 22 and the interpleader statute so that the competing claimants could litigate ownership.³

The court applied Virginia law. Possession created a presumption of ownership, but the museum overcame it with loan records, a police report and insurance records showing the theft. The court held that the possessor “cannot have good title as the possessor of a stolen work of art” and awarded the painting to the museum. Other potential claimants had defaulted, and the insurer that paid the museum’s claim in 1951 had assigned its rights to the museum.³

Bronze vessel: Wei Su v. Sotheby’s (S.D.N.Y. 2019)

A consignor sent an ancient Chinese bronze wine vessel to Sotheby’s for auction in 2014. Before the sale, another person contacted Sotheby’s and said he co-owned the vessel under a judgment of a Shanghai court. Sotheby’s withdrew the vessel and kept it. When the consignor sued for its return, Sotheby’s interpleaded both claimants. The court discharged Sotheby’s as a disinterested stakeholder, and Sotheby’s continued to hold the vessel while the claimants litigated.¹³

In the October 2019 decision, the court dismissed the consignor’s cross-claim for slander of title as untimely under New York’s one-year limitations period. It held that the claim accrued in 2014, when the co-ownership claim stopped the auction, and that continuing legal fees did not restart the period. The court also denied the consignor’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, so the ownership dispute continued.¹³

El Greco: Paul Philippe of Romania v. Christie’s (S.D.N.Y., pending)

Christie’s was due to auction El Greco’s Saint Sébastien in February 2025 on consignment from an art dealer based in the British Virgin Islands. The State of Romania then claimed the painting, saying it had been unlawfully removed from Romania in 1947, and Christie’s withdrew it. An heir claiming through the estate of King Carol II of Romania sued Christie’s for replevin, and Christie’s responded with a Rule 22 interpleader claim against all three claimants. The facts summarized here are those the court took from the pleadings and presumed true for the motion; they are not findings.¹⁰

In a December 18, 2025 opinion, the court:

• held that Romania was not immune, because the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s exception for rights in property in the United States acquired by succession or gift applied;
• dismissed the heir’s replevin claim against Christie’s, because Romania and the dealer were necessary parties who could not be joined to that claim without destroying complete diversity;
• allowed Christie’s interpleader claim and the dealer’s ownership cross-claim to go forward, reasoning that “[i]n a Rule 22 interpleader action, diversity jurisdiction arises if the party initiating the interpleader (the stakeholder) is diverse as to every claimant”; and
• refused to abstain or stay the case in favor of Romania’s later-filed New York state court suit, to prevent what it called “the rank forum shopping” apparent there.¹⁰

The court has not decided who owns the painting.

Party filing: Christie's answer with interpleader counterclaim and third-party claim, Feb. 27, 2025, ECF No. 18 (PDF). Its contents are Christie's allegations, not findings.

Monet: In re Bord de Mer, an 1865 Pastel-on-Paper Painting by Claude Monet (E.D. La. 2024)

In April 2024 the United States, holding the pastel through the FBI, filed an interpleader in federal court in New Orleans. It did not bring a forfeiture case. The court docketed the case as an interpleader under 28 U.S.C. § 1335, and the government’s complaint relied on Rule 22.¹⁴ Judge Eldon E. Fallon presided. Four claimants were named as defendants-in-interpleader:

• an attorney-in-fact acting for two heirs of the family that had owned the pastel before the Nazi era;
• the two collectors who had bought it, one of whom had since died and appeared through the executrix of his estate; and
• M.S. Rau, LLC, the New Orleans gallery that had sold it to them.

According to the complaint, the family’s stored belongings, including the pastel, were seized by the Gestapo in Vienna in 1940 and auctioned in 1941. The complaint also alleges that the pastel resurfaced in France in 2016, that M.S. Rau acquired it from a Paris gallery in 2017 and sold it to the collectors in 2019, and that the collectors signed voluntary waivers when the FBI took custody in 2023.¹⁵ These are the government’s allegations. The court made no findings on them.

No claimant contested the case. Each one waived service, and all five parties filed joint stipulations with a motion for a consent judgment. On May 9, 2024, the court granted the motion “for the reasons provided in the parties’ joint motion and stipulations, which the Court accepts.” It entered final judgment for the heirs’ attorney-in-fact “and against all other parties,” awarding “full ownership, possession, custody, and control of the res in this interpleader action.” The judgment directed the FBI to arrange the transfer of physical custody “within a reasonable period of time.” It dismissed “[a]ny remaining claims inconsistent with the relief granted” with prejudice, “with each party to bear its own costs and fees.”¹⁶

The gallery was therefore one of the parties the judgment ran against, and any inconsistent claim it had was dismissed. The title ruling rests on the parties’ consent, not on a contested decision. The FBI later announced that it returned the pastel to the heirs in October 2024.¹⁷ The docket shows no entries after the judgment, and the case is closed.¹⁴

Court copy: final consent judgment, May 9, 2024, ECF No. 8 (PDF). Party filing: complaint (PDF), Apr. 22, 2024, ECF No. 1; the government’s allegations, not findings.

Questions that often decide these cases

• Was the object stolen, or was it sold under voidable title or entrusted to a dealer? The answer often controls whether a good-faith buyer can keep it.
• Which law applies? The law of the place where the object was when it was sold, or where it is now, may favor one side.
• When did the owner learn where the object was, and did the owner demand it back? Demand-and-refusal and discovery rules can make a decades-old claim timely, or not.
• Is the claim covered by the HEAR Act? If so, laches and similar defenses may be unavailable.
• Who will hold the object while the case goes on, and on what terms?
• Is a foreign state a claimant? Sovereign immunity and indispensable-party rules can reshape the case, as the El Greco litigation shows.

Related

• What is an interpleader action?
• Statutory versus Rule 22 interpleader
• Discharge, fees, and interest
• When a claimant sues first
• Other disputed funds

Footnotes

1. 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a). Cornell LII. ↩ ↩²

2. Fed. R. Civ. P. 22(a)(1). Cornell LII. ↩

3. United States v. Baltimore Museum of Art, 991 F. Supp. 2d 740 (E.D. Va. 2014) (No. 1:13-cv-347). ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴

4. Fed. R. Civ. P. 67(a). Cornell LII. ↩

5. Paul Philippe of Romania v. Christie’s, Inc., No. 1:25-cv-01151 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2025) (order to show cause with temporary restraint, ECF No. 8). ↩

6. U.C.C. § 2-403(1)–(3) (official text; each state enacts its own version). Cornell LII. ↩ ↩² ↩³

7. Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation v. Lubell, 77 N.Y.2d 311 (1991). Cornell LII. ↩

8. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990). ↩

9. Zuckerman v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, 928 F.3d 186 (2d Cir. 2019). ↩

10. Paul Philippe of Romania v. Christie’s, Inc., No. 25 Civ. 1151 (LLS) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2025) (opinion and order, ECF No. 58) (quoting Wei Su v. Sotheby’s, Inc., 2019 WL 4917609, at *2, and Bakalar v. Vavra, 619 F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 2010)); 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(4). ↩ ↩² ↩³

11. Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. 114-308, § 5, 130 Stat. 1524 (22 U.S.C. § 1621 note). GovInfo, as amended. ↩

12. Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2025, Pub. L. 119-82, § 2 (2026). Enrolled bill, GovInfo. ↩

13. Wei Su v. Sotheby’s, Inc., No. 17-CV-4577 (VEC), 2019 WL 4917609 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2019) (memorandum opinion and order). ↩ ↩²

14. In re Bord de Mer, an 1865 Pastel-on-Paper Painting by Claude Monet, No. 2:24-cv-01008-EEF-MBN (E.D. La.) (civil docket: complaint filed Apr. 22, 2024, ECF No. 1; waivers of service, ECF Nos. 3–6; joint motion for consent judgment filed May 8, 2024, ECF No. 7; final consent judgment entered May 10, 2024, ECF No. 8). The docket was checked on Oct. 30, 2026. ↩ ↩²

15. Interpleader Complaint ¶¶ 12–16, In re Bord de Mer, No. 2:24-cv-01008 (E.D. La. Apr. 22, 2024), ECF No. 1. These are allegations only; the court made no findings on them. ↩

16. Final Consent Judgment, In re Bord de Mer, No. 2:24-cv-01008 (E.D. La. May 9, 2024) (Fallon, J.), ECF No. 8. ↩

17. FBI National Press Office, FBI Announces the Repatriation of a Nazi-Looted Monet, Missing for More than 80 Years, to the Heirs of Original Owners (Oct. 9, 2024). ↩

18. Complaint for Interpleader ¶¶ 2–3, 9–24 and prayer for relief, The Henri Stern Watch Agency, Inc. v. Bartolotti, No. 1:26-cv-07044 (S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 18, 2026), ECF No. 1. Allegations only; the court has made no findings. ↩

19. Complaint for Interpleader ¶¶ 2–3, 9–33 and prayer for relief, The Henri Stern Watch Agency, Inc. v. Bailo De Spoelberch, No. 1:26-cv-05421 (S.D.N.Y. filed June 26, 2026), ECF No. 1; docket report. Allegations only; the court has made no findings. ↩

20. Interpleader Complaint ¶¶ 6, 12, 15–23, Ferrari North America, Inc. v. [individual claimant] et al., No. 2:26-cv-12111 (C.D. Cal. filed Oct. 16, 2026), ECF No. 1; notice of related case, ECF No. 2 (docket checked Oct. 30, 2026). Allegations only; the court has made no findings. ↩