South Carolina: Beneficiary Disputes and Interpleader Under South Carolina Law

Divorce and former spouses

South Carolina’s revocation-on-divorce statute reaches life insurance. Except as the express terms of a governing instrument, a court order or a contract dividing the marital estate provide, a divorce or annulment “revokes any revocable . . . beneficiary designation made by a divorced individual to the divorced individual’s former spouse in a governing instrument.” A governing instrument includes “life insurance beneficiary designations, annuity beneficiary designations, retirement plan beneficiary designations and transfer on death accounts,” but “does not include a beneficiary designation made in connection with a governmental employee benefit plan” maintained for employees of the State or a political subdivision.¹ For a plan governed by ERISA, federal law may displace the state statute; see divorce and life insurance.

Where an insured divorced in one state and died in another, which state’s law applies can matter. North Carolina’s revocation statute speaks only of wills.² In Southern Farm Bureau Life v. Howard (D.S.C.), the insurer’s complaint described policies delivered in North Carolina, a former spouse named before a North Carolina divorce, and an insured who later moved to South Carolina, where his widow became the personal representative of his estate. The two claimants settled at mediation. The court directed the insurer to pay them directly under the settlement, discharged it and enjoined further claims against it, so no court decided which state’s law governed.³ See North Carolina.

A claimed forgery

When a change form is forged, it does not change anything. In Protective Life v. Henderson (D.S.C. 2023), the insured’s mother had been the primary beneficiary since 2012, and a later change form named the insured’s former partner. After the insured’s death, both claimed the benefit, and the insurer interpleaded and was discharged. The court explained that “[a]t this late juncture, Protective is merely a disinterested third-party to the dispute between Auman and Henderson. In other words, it is no more than a witness.”⁴ On the partner’s motion for summary judgment, the court stated the rule: “But, in instances involving forgery of a decedent’s signature, the beneficiary designation is ineffective, and thus the next most recent beneficiary designation controls.”⁵

The mother’s evidence included her own opinion that the signature on the form was not her son’s. The court treated it as admissible lay opinion: “Here, Rose’s assertion that the signature was a forgery is an opinion, but it is evidently based on Rose’s personal and firsthand experience, as Joe’s mother, of having observed Joe’s signature.” It concluded that “[a] reasonable jury could find that the Auman Designation is void and Rose is entitled to the proceeds of the Policy,” and denied summary judgment.⁵ The claimants later resolved their dispute, and the court ordered the fund disbursed on their joint motion, so no jury decided the question.⁶ For more, see change-of-beneficiary disputes.

Slayer rule

A named beneficiary of a life insurance policy “who feloniously and intentionally kills” the insured “is not entitled to any benefit under the . . . policy,” and the policy “becomes payable as though the killer had predeceased the decedent.” A final conviction or guilty plea conclusively establishes the killing. Without one, the court, on the petition of an interested person, “must determine whether, upon the preponderance of the evidence standard, the individual would be found responsible for the felonious and intentional killing of the decedent.”⁷ See the slayer rule.

Decisions

Related guides

• State law differences
• North Carolina
• Divorce and life insurance
• Change-of-beneficiary disputes
• Slayer rule

Footnotes

1. S.C. Code Ann. § 62-2-507(a)(4), (c)(1). South Carolina Legislature. ↩

2. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31-5.4. North Carolina General Assembly. ↩

3. Southern Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Howard, No. 7:24-cv-07178-TMC (D.S.C.), order granting consent motion, directing distribution and closing case, ECF No. 30 (July 24, 2025), court order (PDF). Background facts are as alleged in the insurer’s complaint, ECF No. 1; the court’s orders do not discuss the divorce or choice of law. ↩

4. Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Henderson, No. 1:21-cv-02789-MGL (D.S.C.), order discharging the insurer, ECF No. 70 (Nov. 3, 2022), court order (PDF). ↩

5. Henderson, memorandum opinion and order denying summary judgment, ECF No. 95 (May 8, 2023), court order (PDF) (citing Gavin v. North Carolina Mutual Life Ins. Co., 217 S.E.2d 591 (S.C. 1975)). ↩ ↩²

6. Henderson, order on joint motion for disbursement, ECF No. 103 (July 12, 2023), court order (PDF); judgment, ECF No. 104 (July 12, 2023), court judgment (PDF). ↩

7. S.C. Code Ann. § 62-2-803(c), (f). South Carolina Legislature. ↩