District of Columbia: Beneficiary Disputes and Interpleader Under D.C. Law

Start with the federal question

In the District, the first question is often which law applies at all. Federal employees are covered by FEGLI, and private employers’ group plans are usually governed by ERISA. In Barbour the governing law was the federal FEGLI statute, and in Madole it was ERISA. D.C. common law decided only McLaughlin, which involved individually owned annuities. See federal programs and ERISA post-distribution claims.

Divorce: no statute, so the agreement decides

Editors did not find a D.C. statute that automatically revokes a former spouse’s designation on divorce. Without one, the named beneficiary keeps her or his status unless the parties’ agreement shows they meant otherwise. The District Court summarized the test this way: “In deciding whether a former spouse remains a beneficiary of an insurance policy after a divorce, District of Columbia courts have required “convincing evidence” that the spouses’ “separation and property agreement . . . was intended to deprive the named beneficiary of [the] interest.””¹

The same opinion drew the limit: ““General expressions or clauses” in prenuptial agreements that waive interests in property are insufficient to show such intent.”¹

In McLaughlin, the decedent named his then-fiancée on two annuities in 1996 and never changed them after the 2010 divorce. Their prenuptial agreement contained a specific waiver of pension and benefits rights, which the D.C. Superior Court enforced and incorporated in the divorce judgment. The federal court held that it “provides clear, convincing evidence of the parties’ intent to terminate” her status as beneficiary, and declared the estate the beneficiary.² The former wife did not appear, so the ruling came on a default record.

Changing a beneficiary: “unmistakable proof”

Madole was decided under ERISA, but in a footnote the court explained that D.C. law would reach the same result. D.C. requires that “any change in the formally designated beneficiaries … be evidenced by some unmistakable proof that the decedent did actually make the change.”³ The widow’s evidence, letters about adding her to the insured’s coverage, showed only a request for dependent health coverage, not a change of life insurance beneficiary.

Felonious homicide: a conviction-based statute

D.C. Code § 19-320 applies to “A person convicted of felonious homicide of another person, by way of murder or manslaughter”. That person takes nothing from the victim by inheritance, devise, or similar routes, and the property passes “as if the person so convicted had died before the decedent.” For insurance, subsection (b) is blunt: “Policies of insurance directly or indirectly procured by a person convicted as specified by subsection (a) of this section, for his own benefit or payable to him upon the life of the person killed by him, are void.”⁴

Two features stand out. The statute is written around a conviction, unlike uniform-code states that allow a civil court to decide by a preponderance of the evidence. And subsection (b) speaks of policies being void rather than of proceeds passing to an alternate beneficiary. How D.C. courts handle a case with no conviction, or a policy the insured bought, is not addressed by the decisions collected here. See the slayer rule guide.

Decisions

Related guides

• State law differences
• Federal programs
• Divorce and beneficiary designations
• Change of beneficiary

Footnotes

1. McLaughlin v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., No. 17-cv-500 (CRC), slip op. at 6 (D.D.C. Oct. 25, 2017). GovInfo. ↩ ↩²

2. McLaughlin, slip op. at 8. ↩

3. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Madole, 48 F. Supp. 2d 26, n.3 (D.D.C. 1999) (quoting Cohn v. Cohn, 171 F.2d 828, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1948); see Bolle v. Hume, 619 A.2d 1192, 1198 (D.C. 1993)). Justia. ↩

4. D.C. Code § 19-320. D.C. Council Code. ↩