State law
Georgia: Divorce Decrees, Slayer Claims and Interpleader Under Georgia Law
In Georgia, a divorce decree can lock in children's rights to a life insurance policy, but only to a policy the decree identifies. The slayer statute requires clear and convincing evidence when there is no conviction.
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Divorce decrees and vested interests
Under Georgia law, as a federal court summarized it, a beneficiary named by revocable designation generally gets no vested right, and the insured may change the beneficiary at will. A divorce settlement can change that. The court quoted the Supreme Court of Georgia: “[t]he terms of a property settlement agreement may preclude the insured from making a change of beneficiary even though he is given this right by terms of the insurance policy.” So, “where a divorce decree requires the husband to name his children or his former wife as beneficiaries of his life insurance policy and to keep the policy in force, the children or former wife obtain a vested interest in the policy proceeds.”1
The decree has to identify the policy, though it “need not specify the policy number or issuer,” and “even absent language expressly identifying a policy, Georgia courts have been fairly generous in their interpretation of divorce decrees and whether a policy is adequately identified.”1 In Midland National v. Villalobos (N.D. Ga. 2023), a 2009 divorce agreement required the insured to “maintain a life insurance policy on his life with a death benefit of $1,000,000.00, naming the children as beneficiaries.” In 2019 he bought a policy naming his two children, and shortly before he died he added four other beneficiaries for part of it. The court held that nothing in the agreement’s language “can be interpreted to refer to a particular insurance policy—much less the Policy that the Deceased purchased almost 10 years after the Divorce Agreement was finalized,” and granted summary judgment for the added beneficiaries.1 See divorce and life insurance and the full summary.
Employer plans
For coverage under an employer plan governed by ERISA, the plan’s terms decide who takes when no beneficiary was named. In Zaharopoulos v. Taylor (M.D. Ga. 2023), the plan paid first to a “spouse or domestic partner,” and one way to qualify required a declaration signed by the employee. There was no evidence the insured had signed one, so her fiancé did not qualify, and the benefit went to her son.2 See federal programs and ERISA.
Slayer rule
Georgia’s general statute bars one who “feloniously and intentionally kills or conspires to kill or procures the killing,” where the killing “would constitute murder or felony murder or voluntary manslaughter.” Absent a conviction or guilty plea, the facts must be shown by “clear and convincing evidence.” A separate insurance section, O.C.G.A. § 33-25-13, bars a beneficiary who “commits murder or voluntary manslaughter” or conspires to commit murder.3 See the slayer rule.
Interpleader in Georgia federal courts
Federal courts in Georgia often decline to charge the fund for an insurer’s fees. In Lincoln National v. Steward (N.D. Ga. 2017), the court dismissed a claimant’s counterclaims against the insurer and discharged it, but denied fees, concluding that “the dispute arose in the normal course of Lincoln National’s business.”4 See attorneys’ fees in interpleader.
Not every Georgia case reaches the merits. In American General v. DeLong (N.D. Ga.), the insured’s mother contended that changes naming another person “were the result of fraud, undue influence, misrepresentations, duress or lack of capacity.” The insurer was discharged in May 2021, the court denied a motion to transfer the case to another division, and the claimants settled; final judgment followed in July 2022 without any ruling on the challenge.5 See undue influence and capacity.
Decisions
Midland National Life Ins. Co. v. Villalobos (N.D. Ga. 2023)
- Holding
- A divorce agreement requiring "a" policy gave the children no vested interest in a policy bought about ten years later; summary judgment for the added beneficiaries.
Court copies: discharge judgment (PDF); opinion and order, ECF No. 45 (PDF).
Zaharopoulos v. Taylor (M.D. Ga. 2023)
- Holding
- Under the plan's terms, a domestic partner declaration had to be signed by the employee; without one, the claimant did not qualify.
Order: govinfo.gov (PDF). Court copy: judgment (PDF).
Related guides
- State law differences
- Divorce and life insurance
- Slayer rule
- Attorneys’ fees in interpleader
- Florida
- Alabama
Footnotes
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Midland National Life Ins. Co. v. Villalobos, No. 1:22-cv-01117-TWT (N.D. Ga.), opinion and order, ECF No. 45 (Feb. 14, 2023), at 4–5, court order (PDF) (quoting Reeves v. Reeves, 236 Ga. 209, 211–12 (1976), Sparks v. Jackson, 289 Ga. App. 840, 841–42 (2008), and Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Lineberry, 2019 WL 6042274, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 10, 2019)). ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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Zaharopoulos v. Taylor, No. 5:22-cv-348 (MTT) (M.D. Ga.): order, ECF No. 43 (Sept. 6, 2023), govinfo.gov (PDF); disbursement order, ECF No. 46 (Oct. 17, 2023). ↩
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O.C.G.A. § 53-1-5(a), (d); § 33-25-13. Current (2025) text read on Justia (unofficial): § 53-1-5, § 33-25-13. Georgia’s official online code is hosted by a commercial publisher and could not be read for this check. ↩
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Lincoln National Life Ins. Co. v. Steward, No. 1:16-cv-03108-MHC (N.D. Ga.), order discharging the insurer, dismissing counterclaims and denying attorney’s fees, ECF No. 30 (May 31, 2017), at 17, court order (PDF). ↩
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American General Life Ins. Co. v. DeLong, No. 1:21-cv-00790-JPB (N.D. Ga.): order granting discharge, ECF No. 19 (May 26, 2021); order denying transfer, ECF No. 21 (Feb. 7, 2022); final judgment, ECF No. 34 (July 19, 2022), court judgment (PDF). ↩