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Alaska: Beneficiary Disputes and Interpleader Under Alaska Law

Alaska's slayer statute reaches felonious killings, not only intentional ones, and federal judges in Anchorage have read its divorce-revocation section as a presumption that only express terms can overcome.

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On this page
  1. The slayer rule: “feloniously kills”
  2. Divorce: a presumption, and “express terms”
  3. Decisions
  4. Related guides

The slayer rule: “feloniously kills”

Alaska adopted the Uniform Probate Code’s structure but not its exact words. Its homicide section applies to an individual who “feloniously kills” the decedent.1 Many states that use the uniform code require a killing that is both felonious and intentional. The District of Alaska noted the difference in an SGLI interpleader, observing that “Alaska’s slayer statute, however, ‘encompasses intentional as well as unintentional homicides.’”2

The statute builds in a safety valve for that broader reach. Subsection (k) provides: “In the case of an unintentional felonious killing, a court may set aside the application of (a), (b), (d), or (e) of this section if the court makes special findings of fact and conclusions of law that the application of the subsection would result in a manifest injustice and that the subsection should not be applied.”1

How it is proved. Under subsection (f), a final conviction is conclusive. Without one, a court decides on the petition of an interested person whether the killing would be felonious under a preponderance of the evidence standard.1

Federal law decided Donlon

The insured in Donlon was covered by Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance. After a bench trial, the court disqualified the widow-beneficiary under the federal SGLI regulation, 38 C.F.R. § 9.5(e), and the insured's mother took the proceeds. The Alaska statute was discussed only for contrast. See federal programs.

Divorce: a presumption, and “express terms”

AS 13.12.804(a) revokes a revocable disposition to a former spouse, and to the former spouse’s relatives, “Except as provided by the express terms of a governing instrument, a court order, or a contract relating to the division of the marital estate.”3 The section also protects a payor that pays before it receives written notice of the divorce.3

Two decisions by the same judge show how much the phrase “express terms” matters.

  • In Davis, the court had earlier concluded that “the Alaska Supreme Court would construe the revocation-upon-divorce provision of the Alaska Probate Code to create a rebuttable presumption.”4 The former wife overcame it with evidence that the insured told his agent after the divorce that she should stay the primary beneficiary.
  • In Snead, the former wife had remained the named annuity beneficiary for about 13 years after the divorce. The court held that did not matter: “That is to say, AS 13.12.804 revokes any beneficiary designations to a former spouse upon divorce unless “the express terms” of some applicable agreement or court order provide otherwise.” Treating inaction as a rebuttal would mean “the purpose of the statute would be gutted”.5

Read together, the cases suggest that post-divorce statements by the insured have been considered, but silence has not been enough. The two opinions are trial-court rulings, not decisions of the Alaska Supreme Court.

Decisions

State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Davis (D. Alaska 2008)

  • No. 3:07-cv-00164 JWS, Doc. 92
  • Judge John W. Sedwick
  • Decided Dec. 17, 2008
Facts
The insurer interpleaded a policy that still named the insured's former wife. After the court found she was the beneficiary, she settled with her daughters, the contingent beneficiaries, for one-third and then pressed counterclaims against the insurer for negligence, bad faith, and breach of contract.
Holding
The insurer's motion for summary judgment on the counterclaims was denied. Fact questions remained about the agent's duties and the insurer's conduct. The court quoted the Alaska rule that "[a] stakeholder who reasonably and in good faith believes that there are adverse claims to [a] fund cannot be held liable for invoking the protection of [an interpleader]." (slip op. at 15 n.62, quoting the Alaska Supreme Court).
Why it matters
Interpleader protects a stakeholder acting in good faith, but whether it acted in good faith can itself be a fact question.

Opinion: Justia.

Snead v. Wright (D. Alaska 2019)

  • No. 3:19-cv-00209 JWS
  • Judge John W. Sedwick
  • Decided Dec. 3, 2019
Facts
A former wife was the original beneficiary of an annuity. Days before the owner died, a change was submitted naming his partner. The former wife sued the annuity issuer and the broker.
Holding
Her claims failed because § 804 revoked her designation at the 2005 divorce. The divorce agreement did not expressly award her the annuity.
Why it matters
Without express terms preserving the designation, a former spouse may have no stake to protect, even against a disputed last-minute change. This was a direct suit, not an interpleader.

Opinion: HallApproved (unofficial full text).

Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Donlon (D. Alaska 2014, 2015)

  • No. 3:11-cv-0087-HRH
  • Judge H. Russel Holland
  • Order June 2, 2014; findings and conclusions May 7, 2015
Facts
In an SGLI interpleader, the insured's mother alleged that the widow-beneficiary caused his death. The widow asserted self-defense.
Holding
After a bench trial, the court found the killing intentional and wrongful and held the widow disqualified under 38 C.F.R. § 9.5(e). The mother took the proceeds.
Why it matters
A civil court can decide the slayer question without a criminal conviction, and for a federal program the federal standard controls.

Opinions: 2014 order (GovInfo); 2015 findings (GovInfo).

Footnotes

  1. Alaska Stat. § 13.12.803(a), (f), (k). Alaska Legislature. ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  2. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Donlon, No. 3:11-cv-0087-HRH, slip op. at 5 (D. Alaska June 2, 2014). GovInfo. ↩

  3. Alaska Stat. § 13.12.804. Alaska Legislature. ↩ ↩2

  4. State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, No. 3:07-cv-00164 JWS, Doc. 92, slip op. at 1–2 (D. Alaska Dec. 17, 2008) (quoting the court’s earlier order). Justia. ↩

  5. Snead v. Wright, No. 3:19-cv-00209 JWS (D. Alaska Dec. 3, 2019). HallApproved (unofficial). ↩