Divorce and Beneficiary Designations

The first question: who governs the policy or account?

The answer depends on what kind of asset it is:

State revocation-on-divorce statutes

Many states follow the Uniform Probate Code here. Minnesota’s statute, for example, provides that a divorce or annulment “revokes any revocable … beneficiary designation” made to the former spouse or the former spouse’s relatives, unless the governing instrument, a court order, or a property-division contract provides otherwise. The instrument is then read “as if the former spouse died immediately before the dissolution.”¹

In Sveen v. Melin, the Supreme Court held that applying Minnesota’s statute to a policy bought before the statute was enacted did not violate the Constitution’s Contracts Clause.²

That a state may apply its statute to older divorces does not mean its statute does. Utah’s statute, for example, applies regardless of when the designation or the divorce happened, and it reaches a designation made before the marriage. In American General v. Martin, a federal court held that Illinois’s provision, which the court said became effective in 2019, is substantive and does not apply retroactively, so a former wife named before a 2006 divorce kept the proceeds.³ Alabama reached a similar result. Its statute, Ala. Code § 30-4-17, took effect September 1, 2015, and the Alabama Supreme Court has called it a “prospective default rule” that applied to a 2016 divorce even though the policy was older.⁴ A federal court then held that it did not revoke a designation where the divorce was in 2003.⁵ See Alabama.

Oklahoma’s statute, 15 O.S. § 178, revokes “all provisions in the contract in favor of the decedent’s former spouse” when the insured dies after the divorce, and treats the former spouse “as having predeceased the decedent.” It has exceptions, including a decree or contract that expresses a contrary intention, a contract made after the divorce, and a post-divorce writing delivered to the payor that renames the former spouse. Its reach is limited by date: the section applies “to any contract of a decedent made and entered into on or after November 1, 1987.” A policy bought before that date is outside the statute even if the divorce came later.⁶ Where the insured dies in Oklahoma, the law of another state may still govern the policy: in Modern Woodmen v. Harris, a federal court in Alabama rejected the widow’s argument that Oklahoma law should control because the insured died domiciled there, and applied Alabama law because the certificate was applied for in Alabama and named no governing law.⁵

Colorado’s statute, C.R.S. § 15-11-804, follows the Uniform Probate Code. Its revocation applies except “as provided by the express terms of a governing instrument, a court order, or a contract relating to the division of the marital estate made between the divorced individuals before or after the marriage, divorce, or annulment.”⁷ A Colorado federal case applying the court-order exception is summarized below.

New York’s statute, EPTL 5-1.4, works the same way unless a governing instrument, such as a court order or a property-division agreement, expressly provides otherwise. In State Farm v. Hobin, a separation agreement clause making unpaid amounts payable from “any life insurance policy” did not preserve a former wife’s designation, because the agreement never mentioned the policy and she showed no past-due debt.⁸ See New York.

Unmarried partners. These statutes are triggered by the legal events they name, such as a divorce or annulment. A breakup is not one of them. Washington’s statute, RCW 11.07.010, applies when “a marriage or state registered domestic partnership is dissolved or invalidated, or a state registered domestic partnership terminated.”⁹ In Minnesota Life v. Roberson, a federal court held that it did not revoke the designation of an insured’s former partner because they had never married or registered a domestic partnership, and she kept her 50% share.¹⁰ The policy in that case was an employer group policy. The court decided it under Washington law and did not discuss ERISA or Egelhoff, which held that ERISA preempts this same Washington statute as applied to ERISA plans.¹¹

Not every state has such a statute. New Hampshire keeps the common-law rule that divorce alone does not remove a former spouse, and a general mutual release in a divorce stipulation is not enough. In the District of Columbia, courts look instead for convincing evidence that a separation or property agreement was meant to end the former spouse’s interest. Michigan takes a third approach: every judgment of divorce or separate maintenance must decide each spouse’s rights in the other’s life insurance, and if it does not, the policy is payable to the insured’s estate (see Michigan’s statute).

The exceptions matter, too. A divorce decree that requires one spouse to keep the other as beneficiary, for example to secure support, can keep the designation in force.

Older divorces and decrees that award the policy

Revocation statutes have effective dates. California’s § 5040 became operative on January 1, 2002, and § 5048(c) provides that §§ 5040 and 5042 do not apply, and earlier law governs, when the transferor died before that date or the divorce occurred before it.¹² Section 5040 also does not reach “a provision of a life insurance policy.”¹³ So for a California life policy, a divorce, particularly one before 2002, usually leaves the ex-spouse’s designation to the policy, the divorce judgment and the courts.

In Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Estate of Smith, an insured named her then-husband as primary beneficiary on a policy issued in 1984. The couple divorced in April 2000, and the judgment of dissolution confirmed “[o]ther life insurance policies on the life of [the insured]” to her as her separate property. She never changed the beneficiary and died in March 2018; no claim was made at the time, and the insurer learned of the death from a Social Security death notice. Her estate’s administrator contested the ex-spouse’s designation, arguing that the decree’s award of the policy to her divested him of any interest, including the right to be beneficiary. The court found the insurer faced “competing claims to the Death Benefit arising from potential divorce revocation,” discharged it, enjoined further suits against it under 28 U.S.C. § 2361, and awarded $14,712.00 in fees and $402.00 in costs by agreement.¹⁴ The court did not decide the estate’s theory. The claimants settled: the final judgment paid $482,400.22 plus all accrued interest to the ex-spouse beneficiary of record and $200,000 to the estate.¹⁵

What the order awards is what the former spouse gets. In State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Hoops (D. Colo. 2017), the divorce decree was entered eight days before the insured died, with property issues reserved. Months later the divorce court entered permanent orders, nunc pro tunc to the decree date, awarding the former wife “fifty-percent of the value of [the insured’s] life insurance policy” and reciting a $40,000 cash surrender value. The federal court held that the orders fit Colorado’s court-order exception: they “expressly provide for [the former spouse] to receive ‘value’ from the policy despite the divorce, as permitted by Colorado law.” But the value was fixed as of the decree date, before the death: “There is no dispute that the ‘value’ of the policy on the effective date of the Permanent Orders was its cash surrender value, or $40,000.” The former wife received $20,000, half the cash value, and the insured’s son, the successor beneficiary, received the remaining $49,605 of the death benefit, each with proportionate interest.¹⁶ See the decision summary.

A decree that requires “a” policy. In Midland National v. Villalobos (N.D. Ga. 2023), a 2009 divorce agreement required the insured to “maintain a life insurance policy on his life with a death benefit of $1,000,000.00, naming the children as beneficiaries and the Wife as Trustee for the benefit of the children as long as he shall be obligated to pay child support hereunder.” In 2019 he bought a $1,000,000 policy naming his two children. Four days before he died in 2021, the insurer received a change form that reduced each child’s share to 35% and added four other beneficiaries. The insurer paid $700,000 plus interest to a trust for the children and interpleaded the rest. Applying Georgia law, the court held that nothing in the agreement “can be interpreted to refer to a particular insurance policy—much less the Policy that the Deceased purchased almost 10 years after the Divorce Agreement was finalized,” and awarded the interpleaded fund to the four added beneficiaries in the shares the change form gave them.¹⁷ See the decision summary and Georgia.

A settlement agreement that points both ways. New Jersey’s revocation statute yields to “the express terms of a governing instrument, a court order, or a contract relating to the division of the marital estate,” so the wording of a settlement agreement can matter.¹⁸ In American General v. Ammaturo (D.N.J.), a $1,000,000 policy issued in 2005 named the insured’s then-wife as primary beneficiary and their older child as contingent beneficiary. According to the insurer’s complaint, the couple’s 2022 marital settlement agreement, incorporated in their June 2022 divorce judgment, said in one article that neither spouse had to keep life insurance naming the other. The next article said each would name the other as beneficiary for the children’s benefit until they were emancipated. The insured died in December 2022 without changing the designation. The insurer said it could not tell whether the statute revoked the former wife’s designation, which would send the benefit to the contingent beneficiary, or what effect the agreement had. It pointed to the apparent conflict between the two articles, to a designation made in the former wife’s own name rather than for the children, and to the question whether the agreement gave the younger child, then a minor, a protectable interest. It filed its interpleader in March 2023. These are the insurer’s allegations, not findings.¹⁹ See New Jersey.

Ohio courts have addressed a related question. Under Ohio law, a divorce treats a former spouse named as beneficiary as if he or she had died first unless the designation or the decree says otherwise, and a decree that orders new coverage for the children does not rewrite an old policy; see Ohio divorce rules. In Tennessee, under Holt v. Holt, a marital dissolution agreement requiring a named beneficiary on an existing policy creates an equitable interest, and federal courts there read that language closely; see Tennessee marital dissolution agreements.

A partner who was never a spouse

Revocation-on-divorce statutes need a marriage and a divorce. In Fidelity & Guaranty Life Ins. Co. v. Shipman, the insured had named her long-term partner on a New Mexico policy as “spouse,” though they were never legally married; the relationship ended in 2016, and she later married someone else. The former partner moved for summary judgment, arguing in part that New Mexico’s revocation statute, NMSA 1978, § 45-2-804, could not apply because there had been no marriage. The parties largely abandoned that argument at the hearing, but the court noted that “the plain text of the statute clearly requires there to have been a legal marriage and then a divorce for the statute to be invoked” (at 4 n.3).²⁰ The case turned instead on a disputed change-of-beneficiary form; see change of beneficiary.

A change made while a divorce is pending

Some states restrict what spouses may do with property once a divorce is filed. In Wisconsin, from the filing or service of the petition until dismissal or final judgment, neither party may engage in “encumbering, concealing, damaging, destroying, transferring, or otherwise disposing of property owned by either or both of the parties, without the consent of the other party or an order of the court, except in the usual course of business,” among other limits.²¹ Whether changing a life insurance beneficiary is a transfer or disposal of property under a statute like this is a question for the court.

In American General v. Ball, a Wisconsin federal case, the insured’s spouse and his brother both claimed a $300,000 policy. According to the insurer’s complaint, the spouse had been the primary beneficiary, a change naming the brother was processed in October 2024 while a divorce was pending, and the insured died later that month. The court described both claimants as having “asserted property interests” in the policy, discharged the insurer under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335 and 2361, and left the two claimants to resolve their claims. They reached an agreement, and the court ordered the fund disbursed under it and closed the case, so no court decided whether the Wisconsin statute applied.²²

Other states address the question directly. In Massachusetts, a Probate and Family Court rule bars either spouse in a pending divorce from changing a life insurance beneficiary without the other’s written consent or a court order, and federal courts there have given such changes no effect; see the Massachusetts restraining order. Pennsylvania’s divorce statute can apply even when the insured dies before the decree; see Pennsylvania’s rule.

Which state’s statute applies?

When the couple divorced in one state and the insured later lived or died in another, the answer can turn on which state’s law governs, and the state of the divorce, not the state of death, can control.

• In Thrivent v. Bloomquist, a couple divorced in California, and the decree did not mention the insured’s life insurance. She later moved to Nevada, whose statute, NRS 111.781, revokes a designation of a former spouse in a governing instrument, a term Nevada defines to include an insurance policy.²³ California’s revocation statute does not apply to life insurance, and California requires every divorce judgment to warn that a divorce “does not automatically cancel your spouse’s rights as beneficiary of your life insurance policy.”²⁴ The court applied California law because the couple divorced there under California law, the decree recited that both spouses were aware of that warning, and the insured moved to Nevada well after the divorce. The former husband remained the beneficiary.²⁵ The ruling was a default judgment, because the executor who had contested payment never appeared, but the court decided the choice-of-law question as part of the merits before entering judgment: “The court holds that California law applies to this dispute.” California’s Probate Code confirms the life insurance exclusion: § 5040 defines the “nonprobate transfer” it revokes as a provision “other than a provision of a life insurance policy.”¹³
• In Modern Woodmen v. Harris, a federal court in Alabama applied Alabama law, the law of the place where the contract was made, and rejected the argument that the law of the state where the insured died should control.⁵

Courts apply their own choice-of-law rules, so the result can differ from state to state. Where the divorce happened, where the policy was issued and where the insured lived can all matter.

Neighboring states can point in different directions. South Carolina’s statute, S.C. Code Ann. § 62-2-507(c), revokes a revocable beneficiary designation to a former spouse on divorce, subject to the express terms of a governing instrument, a court order or a property-division contract, and defines a governing instrument to include “life insurance beneficiary designations.”²⁶ North Carolina’s revocation-on-divorce statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31-5.4, speaks only of wills.²⁷ In Southern Farm Bureau Life v. Howard (D.S.C.), the insurer’s complaint described policies delivered in North Carolina, a former spouse named before a North Carolina divorce, and an insured who later moved to South Carolina, where his widow became the personal representative of his estate. The two claimants settled at mediation, and the court directed the insurer to pay them directly under the settlement, discharged it and enjoined further claims against it, so no court decided which state’s law governed.²⁸ See South Carolina and North Carolina.

ERISA plans: the plan documents control

For employer-sponsored life insurance and retirement plans governed by ERISA, two Supreme Court decisions set the rules:

• In Egelhoff, the Court held that ERISA preempts a state statute revoking a former spouse’s designation, so the plan pays the named beneficiary.¹¹
• In Kennedy, the Court held that a plan administrator properly paid the named former spouse even though she had waived her interest in the divorce decree, because the administrator must follow the plan documents.²⁹

Kennedy left open whether the estate could sue the former spouse after payment. The Third Circuit and the Fourth Circuit have since held that ERISA does not preempt such a suit to enforce a divorce-related waiver.³⁰ That is a separate case against the recipient, not a claim against the plan. For how these claims interact with interpleader, including deciding them before the money leaves the court’s registry, see ERISA post-distribution claims.

A former spouse named after the divorce. Revocation statutes do not reach a designation made after the decree. In Aetna v. Vacknitz (S.D. Tex. 2019), the insured changed his ERISA group coverage online, the night before he died, to name his former wife; his widow challenged the change for lack of capacity rather than under the divorce statute. The insurer interpleaded, was discharged, and the claimants settled.³¹ Texas’s statute, for example, reaches only designations made before the decree and gives effect to a former spouse whom the insured “redesignates … after rendition of the decree.”³²

Decrees that require insurance for a child: the QDRO question

A divorce decree may require a parent to keep life insurance for a child’s support. If the plan’s beneficiary form names someone else, the claimants relying on the decree may argue that it is a qualified domestic relations order, or QDRO. ERISA defines a domestic relations order as a judgment, decree or order that relates to “child support, alimony payments, or marital property rights” and is made under state domestic relations law, and a QDRO as one that “creates or recognizes the existence of an alternate payee’s right” to receive benefits under a plan and meets the statute’s other requirements.³³ ERISA’s preemption clause does not apply to QDROs.³⁴ Those rules sit in ERISA’s pension provisions, and whether a decree can be a QDRO for life insurance or accidental death benefits under a welfare plan is not settled everywhere. The Fifth Circuit, which covers Texas, Louisiana and Mississippi, noted in 1994 the Tenth Circuit’s view that the QDRO exception applies to both pension and welfare benefit plans, but found it unnecessary to decide the question.³⁵ Egelhoff and Kennedy make the plan documents the starting point, so a decree that does not qualify may leave the claimant to a separate claim against the person paid.

An example that settled before the question was decided. In MetLife v. Evans, a Texas federal case under an employer’s group life and accidental death and dismemberment plans, the insured died on August 30, 2023. As the dispute was framed by the parties, the surviving spouse was named on the last beneficiary form, and the other claimants relied on an earlier divorce decree that required life insurance for a child’s support. The insurer filed its interpleader on September 3, 2024, about 12 months after the death.³⁶ At a December 18, 2024 hearing, the court granted the insurer’s motion to deposit the benefits and, rather than entering default against two claimants, said it would docket the answers they had submitted and “will not enter default against them at this time.”³⁷ Two days later it discharged the insurer with prejudice, enjoined claims against the insurer, the plans and the employer, and allowed the insurer a modest fee and costs from the fund.³⁸ The claimants then settled. On January 30, 2025, about five months after filing, the court entered a final judgment on their joint motion directing the registry funds to be paid as follows:³⁶

Claimant (by role)	Amount	Share of accumulated interest
Surviving spouse named on the beneficiary form	$1,799,586.78	77%
Trustee designated to hold insurance proceeds for the insured’s son	$415,374.19	18%
One of the insured’s other children	$50,000.00	2.5%
Another of the insured’s children	$50,000.00	2.5%

The judgment also released and permanently enjoined claims among the claimants, and against the insured’s estate, concerning his “child support and life insurance obligations,” and dismissed the case with prejudice. Most of the fund went to the named spouse. Because the case settled, no court decided whether the divorce decree could operate as a QDRO for the life or accidental death benefits. Compare the default rulings in Reliance Standard v. Coleman and Prudential v. Iturbide, where claimants who never answered lost their claims; in Evans the court accepted the answers instead.

In a Rhode Island case, a divorcing parent’s promise in a Family Court settlement to keep the children as beneficiaries could support a constructive trust claim against a later-named beneficiary. Because an ERISA plan was involved, the court treated the Family Court decree under ERISA’s domestic relations order rules.

A settlement approved for minor children

MetLife v. Lawless, a New Jersey federal case, set the last-named spouse against a former spouse who relied on a property settlement. About nine months before he died, the insured changed the beneficiary of three group life insurance plans to his wife. Before that, the plans had named his brother, his former spouse, and their two children in various shares. The former spouse relied on their marital settlement agreement, which she said required him to keep life insurance for her and for the children. The parties argued over whether ERISA preempted claims based on that agreement for the two plans described as ERISA-governed; the third was said not to be.³⁹ After the court refused to stay the federal case and discharged the insurer, the insurer deposited $9,714,711.14 into the court’s registry, and the claimants settled every claim in the federal case and in the related state probate and family-court cases.⁴⁰

Because two claimants were minors, the settlement needed the court’s approval. The court had appointed a guardian ad litem for the children in September 2019. It held a hearing on the record and, on April 27, 2020, about 10½ months after the insurer filed, entered a final judgment on the joint motion for approval of the minors’ settlement. It found the guardian believed the settlement to be in the children’s best interests, that “the settlement amount is fair and reasonable and in the minors’ best interests,” and that it had reviewed the fees to be paid to all attorneys and to the guardian and found them “fair and reasonable.” It directed the fund paid as follows:⁴⁰

Payee (by role)	Amount	Share of accrued interest (less the registry fee)
The insured’s wife, named on the plans	$4,631,974.27	47.68%
The two minor children (in trust), in equal shares	$3,282,736.87	52.32%
The insured’s former spouse	$1,500,000.00	None stated
The insured’s brother	$50,000.00	None stated
Fee payment ordered to the law firm representing the former spouse and the brother	$125,000.00	None stated
Guardian ad litem, fees and disbursements for this case and two state court proceedings	$125,000.00	None stated

The children’s share was to be placed in trusts reflecting the dispositive provisions of the trust in the insured’s will, with trustees agreed on by the brother, the former spouse and the guardian. Each party otherwise bore its own costs and attorney’s fees, the guardian was discharged, and the case was dismissed with prejudice.⁴⁰ As in Evans, no court decided the preemption question, and the named spouse received the largest share.

Settlements involving minors. In New Jersey’s state courts, Rule 4:44-3 provides that proceedings “to enter a judgment to consummate a settlement in matters involving minors” are heard by the court without a jury, and that “[t]he court shall determine whether the settlement is fair and reasonable as to its amount and terms.”⁴¹ The Lawless judgment cited the District of New Jersey’s Local Rule 83.3 and referred to Rule 4:44-3, and its findings are consistent with that standard. In federal court, Rule 17(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires the court to “appoint a guardian ad litem—or issue another appropriate order—to protect a minor or incompetent person who is unrepresented in an action.”⁴² Expect a guardian’s report, a hearing or written findings, and a trust or other protected arrangement for a child’s share before the money is released. For a Texas example, see settling an interpleader.

How a minor’s share is paid. Even without a settlement, courts scrutinize where a child’s money will go. In Everlake v. Taylor, an Oklahoma federal case decided by default, the insured’s two minor children were the only remaining claimants. Before entering judgment, the court set a hearing and directed the movant to be prepared to address “the nature of the entity which will hold the trust funds,” who should receive the payment, why another state’s law should govern the trust, and “whether adequate provision for protection of the minor children’s interests is otherwise made.”⁴³ The final judgment then directed the clerk to pay the fund to a trust established exclusively for the two children, to be held until they reach the age of majority.⁴⁴ See the decision summary.

Contingent beneficiaries after a divorce. In two Florida federal cases against different insurers, the insured’s former wife was still the named primary beneficiary, and both insurers denied her claim because of the divorce. The couple’s three minor children, as contingent beneficiaries, sued through a disinterested next friend, and the former wife was brought in as a claimant. The court noted the parties’ representation that there was evidence the insured meant her to remain beneficiary “after their divorce and reconciliation,” which made the outcome uncertain. It approved the children’s settlement in the first case without a guardian ad litem; in the second, the former wife defaulted and the court approved the children’s settlement and entered default judgment against her.⁴⁵ See minor beneficiaries and Florida’s revocation statute.

Federal programs

• FEGLI. The Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act pays the designated beneficiary first. A court decree of divorce, annulment, or legal separation, or a related court order or settlement, can direct payment to someone else only if it was received before death by the employing agency or, if the employee had left federal service, by the Office of Personnel Management.⁴⁶ In Hillman, the Supreme Court held that a state law allowing a widow to recover FEGLI proceeds from a named former spouse was preempted.⁴⁷
• Thrift Savings Plan. The Tenth Circuit applied Hillman’s reasoning to hold that state-law claims to TSP funds paid to the named beneficiary were preempted.⁴⁸
• SGLI. In Ridgway, the Supreme Court held that a servicemember’s designation under SGLI prevailed over a constructive trust imposed under a state divorce decree.⁴⁹

See federal programs for more on how these programs pay.

How these disputes usually begin

Divorce-related claims are among the most common reasons a payment is held. The claim usually arrives as a letter or call after the death. These illustrative examples, written for this guide, show the typical patterns:

• A former spouse who is still named, and a family member or the estate who says the divorce should have ended that designation.
• A former spouse who is no longer named, but says “the decree required him to keep me as beneficiary” or that the policy was to be kept “for the children.”
• A current spouse and a former spouse who both claim, one relying on the form and the other on the divorce papers.
• A divorce that was filed but not finished at the time of death, leaving it unclear whether the named spouse is still a spouse.
• Two people who each say they were the insured’s legal spouse. In Reliance Standard v. Coleman, that kind of dispute ended by default when one claimant never answered, without any ruling on the marriage.

Which claim wins depends on the governing law and the exact words of the decree, as the decisions below show.

How courts have ruled

Practical points

• Find out first whether the policy or plan is an employer plan, a federal program, or an individual contract. The answer often decides the case.
• Read the divorce decree and any settlement agreement for language about insurance or retirement benefits.
• If you are a former spouse who is still named, a waiver in your divorce settlement may matter even if the plan pays you.

Related: how a claim freezes payment, retirement accounts, and summaries of key decisions.

Footnotes

1. Minn. Stat. § 524.2-804, subds. 1–2. Minnesota Revisor of Statutes. ↩

2. Sveen v. Melin, 584 U.S. 811 (2018). ↩

3. American General Life Ins. Co. v. Martin, No. 1:22-cv-04422 (N.D. Ill.), memorandum opinion and order, ECF No. 75 (Dec. 3, 2024), court order (PDF); judgment, ECF No. 76 (Dec. 3, 2024), court judgment (PDF); discharge order, ECF No. 58 (May 5, 2023). Also on Justia (unofficial). ↩

4. Blalock v. Sutphin, 275 So. 3d 519 (Ala. 2018). FindLaw (unofficial). Statute: Alabama Legislature. ↩

5. Modern Woodmen of America v. Harris, No. 7:26-cv-00239-EGL (N.D. Ala.): memorandum opinion and order, ECF No. 30 (Aug. 20, 2026), at 5, 7, 10–13, court order (PDF); final judgment, ECF No. 31 (Aug. 20, 2026), court judgment (PDF); disbursement order, ECF No. 33 (Sept. 1, 2026). ↩ ↩² ↩³

6. 15 O.S. § 178(A), (B), (D). Justia (unofficial copy of the Oklahoma Statutes). The Oklahoma Supreme Court quotes subsection (A) in Ghoussoub v. Yammine (Okla. 2022), OSCN. ↩

7. C.R.S. § 15-11-804(2). Colorado General Assembly, Colorado Revised Statutes 2024, Title 15 (uncertified printout). ↩

8. State Farm Life & Accident Assurance Co. v. Hobin, No. 1:22-cv-00611-LJV-LGF (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2024). Decision and order (PDF). ↩

9. RCW 11.07.010(1), (2)(a). Washington State Legislature. Current text; the version in effect on a given date may differ. ↩

10. Minnesota Life Ins. Co. v. Roberson, No. 2:18-cv-01058-RAJ (W.D. Wash. Aug. 2, 2019), ECF No. 31. Court order (PDF). ↩

11. Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141 (2001). ↩ ↩²

12. Cal. Prob. Code § 5048. California Legislative Information. ↩

13. Cal. Prob. Code § 5040(e). California Legislative Information; Justia (unofficial, 2025 code). ↩ ↩²

14. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Estate of Smith, No. 1:23-cv-00722-SAB (E.D. Cal.), order granting stipulated motion for interpleader relief and attorneys’ fee award, ECF No. 26 (Sept. 8, 2023), court order (PDF), at 4–5, 7. ↩

15. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Estate of Smith, No. 1:23-cv-00722-SAB (E.D. Cal.), order granting entry of final judgment, ECF No. 32 (Nov. 30, 2023), court order (PDF), at 2; clerk’s judgment, ECF No. 33 (Nov. 30, 2023), court judgment (PDF). ↩

16. State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Hoops, No. 1:16-cv-01136-RM-KLM (D. Colo.), recommendation of United States magistrate judge, ECF No. 55 (Feb. 27, 2017), court order (PDF), at 6–10; order adopting recommendation, ECF No. 58 (Mar. 29, 2017), court order (PDF); order for disbursement, ECF No. 63 (Apr. 17, 2017). ↩

17. Midland National Life Ins. Co. v. Villalobos, No. 1:22-cv-01117-TWT (N.D. Ga.), opinion and order, ECF No. 45 (Feb. 14, 2023), court order (PDF); discharge judgment, ECF No. 34 (Aug. 2, 2022), court order (PDF). ↩

18. N.J.S.A. 3B:3-14(a), as quoted in Aromando v. State Farm Life Ins. Co., No. 17-02418 (SRC), slip op. at 5 (D.N.J. Nov. 15, 2017). GovInfo. ↩

19. Complaint for Interpleader Relief ¶¶ 7–29, American General Life Ins. Co. v. Ammaturo, No. 2:23-cv-01656 (D.N.J. filed Mar. 23, 2023), ECF No. 1, complaint (PDF). Allegations only. ↩

20. Fidelity & Guaranty Life Ins. Co. v. Shipman, No. 1:23-cv-00731-DHU-LF (D.N.M.), memorandum opinion and order, ECF No. 43 (June 26, 2024), court order (PDF), at 1–4 & n.3. Statute text: N.M. Stat. Ann. § 45-2-804, Justia (unofficial). ↩

21. Wis. Stat. § 767.117(1)(b). Wisconsin State Legislature. ↩

22. American General Life Ins. Co. v. Ball, No. 2:25-cv-00152-JPS (E.D. Wis.), order, ECF No. 26 (June 24, 2025), at 1–2; order granting disbursement, ECF No. 30 (Nov. 12, 2025) (court record; not reproduced). Background facts are as alleged in the insurer’s complaint, ECF No. 1; the court’s orders do not discuss the divorce or the statute. ↩

23. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 111.781(1)(a), (11)(d); see Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 111.713, 132.155 (“governing instrument” includes an “insurance policy or annuity, designated as payable on death”). Nevada Legislature (ch. 111); ch. 132. Text checked on the Legislature’s site on October 29, 2026. Subsection 10 limits the section to nonprobate transfers that take effect because of a death on or after October 1, 2011, regardless of when the divorce occurred; subsection 6 protects a payor who pays in good faith before written or actual notice. ↩

24. Cal. Fam. Code § 2024(b). California Legislative Information. On California’s revocation statute and its life insurance exclusion, see Cal. Prob. Code § 5040 and California. ↩

25. Order granting default judgment and discharge, Thrivent Financial for Lutherans v. Bloomquist, No. 2:17-cv-01555-JCM-NJK (D. Nev. July 3, 2018), ECF No. 32. Court order (PDF). ↩

26. S.C. Code Ann. § 62-2-507(a)(4), (c). South Carolina Legislature. ↩

27. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31-5.4. North Carolina General Assembly. ↩

28. Southern Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Howard, No. 7:24-cv-07178-TMC (D.S.C.), order granting consent motion, directing distribution and closing case, ECF No. 30 (July 24, 2025), court order (PDF). Background facts are as alleged in the insurer’s complaint, ECF No. 1; the court’s orders do not discuss the divorce or choice of law. ↩

29. Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Savings & Investment Plan, 555 U.S. 285 (2009). ↩

30. Estate of Kensinger v. URL Pharma, Inc., 674 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2012); Andochick v. Byrd, 709 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2013). ↩

31. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Vacknitz, No. 4:19-cv-01590 (S.D. Tex.): order granting interpleader and discharge, ECF No. 13 (Oct. 10, 2019); order of dismissal on announcement of settlement, ECF No. 17 (Oct. 29, 2019); final judgment, ECF No. 19 (Nov. 20, 2019), court judgment (PDF). The description of the claims comes from the case file, not from a ruling; no court decided capacity. ↩

32. Tex. Fam. Code § 9.301(a)(2). Texas Constitution and Statutes. ↩

33. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)–(ii). Cornell LII. ↩

34. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(7). Cornell LII. ↩

35. Brandon v. Travelers Ins. Co., 18 F.3d 1321 (5th Cir. 1994), n.6 (citing Carland v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 935 F.2d 1114, 1120 (10th Cir. 1991)). Fifth Circuit opinion (PDF). The reporter citation is confirmed by later Fifth Circuit opinions citing Brandon, 18 F.3d at 1324–27. ↩

36. Final Judgment and Order of Interpleader Disbursement, Evans, ECF No. 38 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2025), ¶ 1 and decretal paragraphs. Court judgment (PDF). The judgment’s recitals of the dates of the deposit order and the deposit contain apparent typographical errors; the deposit order is ECF No. 28, entered December 20, 2024. ↩ ↩²

37. Hearing minutes, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, No. 4:24-cv-03276 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2024, filed Dec. 19, 2024), ECF No. 27.. ↩

38. Order, Evans, ECF No. 28 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 20, 2024). Court order (PDF). ↩

39. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Lawless, No. 3:19-cv-13688-MAS-ZNQ (D.N.J. Nov. 15, 2019), ECF No. 39 (memorandum opinion and order denying stay), at 2–4. ↩

40. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Lawless, No. 3:19-cv-13688-ZNQ (D.N.J. Apr. 27, 2020), ECF No. 72 (final judgment and order of interpleader disbursement), at 1–5, court judgment (PDF); see also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Lawless, No. 3:19-cv-13688-MAS-ZNQ (D.N.J. filed Dec. 5, 2019), ECF No. 46 (consent order providing interpleader relief). ↩ ↩² ↩³

41. N.J. Ct. R. 4:44-3, as quoted in S.T. v. 1515 Broad St., LLC, 241 N.J. 257 (2020). New Jersey Courts (PDF). ↩

42. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c)(2). Cornell LII. ↩

43. Everlake Assurance Co. v. Taylor, No. 5:25-cv-00359-HE (W.D. Okla.), order, ECF No. 26 (July 14, 2025). ↩

44. Everlake Assurance Co. v. Taylor, No. 5:25-cv-00359-HE (W.D. Okla.), final judgment and order of interpleader disbursement, ECF No. 29 (Aug. 18, 2025), court judgment (PDF). ↩

45. Minor children’s suit against Principal Life Ins. Co., No. 3:23-cv-24636-MCR-HTC (N.D. Fla.) (captioned by the children’s initials): order granting deposit, discharge and dismissal of the insurer, ECF No. 15 (Mar. 5, 2024); order staying the case, ECF No. 17 (Mar. 14, 2024); order, ECF No. 21 (Apr. 11, 2024); order approving settlement, ECF No. 23 (May 1, 2024), at 1–9, court order (PDF); judgment, ECF No. 24 (May 1, 2024), court judgment (PDF). Minor children’s suit against USAA Life Ins. Co., No. 3:24-cv-00577-MCR-HTC (N.D. Fla.): clerk’s default, ECF No. 15 (Mar. 31, 2025); order approving settlement, ECF No. 19 (Dec. 22, 2025), court order (PDF). ↩

46. 5 U.S.C. § 8705(a), (e). Cornell LII. ↩

47. Hillman v. Maretta, 569 U.S. 483 (2013). ↩

48. Evans v. Diamond, 957 F.3d 1098 (10th Cir. 2020). ↩

49. Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46 (1981). ↩